CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE SUPREME COURT:
THE ARTICLE V PROBLEM
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How the Supreme Court has interpreted and given meaning to
the United States Constitution, and thus created constitutional law,
has changed dramatically over time. Major doctrinal shifts have occurred without any change in constitutional text or newly discovered
historical evidence about what the Constitution originally meant. To
give just a few of many examples, how Congress may regulate com1
merce, what kind of aid the government may give to religious
2
3
schools, what right, if any, a woman has to terminate her pregnancy,
4
what the Second Amendment means, and what level of protection
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Compare Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22, 32–33 (2005) (holding that the Commerce
Clause allows Congress to regulate purely local activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce), with United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608, 613 (2000) (holding that
the Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to regulate noneconomic activities with
indirect economic effects, because the distinction between “what is national and what is
local” would be obliterated (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995))),
and Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (holding that the Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to
regulate non-commercial activities).
Compare Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652–53 (2002) (holding that a government program that gave neutral aid with respect to religion and gave assistance to citizens, who then privately chose to fund religious schools, did not violate the Establishment
Clause), with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248–51 (1977) (holding that giving instructional materials other than textbooks to students attending religious schools violated the
Establishment Clause).
Compare Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156, 161–64 (2007) (holding that a partialbirth abortion ban was constitutional even without an exception for the health of the
mother), with Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (recognizing “the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State,” but confirming a state’s right to restrict abortions after viability), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 163 (1973) (holding
that a woman has a fundamental right to privacy that enables her to choose to terminate
her pregnancy during the first trimester).
Compare McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (holding that the Due
Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment right for an individual to keep and
bear arms against state laws), and District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)
(holding that the Second Amendment protects individuals’ right to possess a firearm and

443

444

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 16:2

5

courts should give to commercial speech, are all issues the Court has
answered differently at various times in our history. How to account
for these constitutional changes is an issue that has vexed scholars
and judges for generations. After all, as Judge Posner has observed,
6
“[i]f changing judges changes law, it is not even clear what law is.”
My contribution to this fine symposium on constitutional interpretation addresses one small component of the large and complex
question surrounding constitutional change. This Article concerns
the interplay between judicial review and Article V of the Constitution, which sets out the procedures for formally amending the Con7
stitution. According to the text, the Constitution can only be
amended if two-thirds of both Houses of Congress and three-fourths
8
of the states agree or two-thirds of the states call for a convention.
This Article addresses when, if ever, judicial interpretations of the
Constitution amount to illegitimate and de facto amendments to the
Constitution because they were not implemented through Article V
procedures.
Although I believe our country would be better off with a strongly
deferential system of judicial review where courts only overturn decisions of other political actors if those decisions are at an “irreconcila9
ble variance” with clear constitutional text, we do not live in that
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to use that firearm for lawful self-defense in their homes), with United States v. Miller, 307
U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (“In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or
use of a [firearm] . . . at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.”).
Compare 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (holding that
commercial speech that is misleading or deceptive can be regulated and “therefore justifies less than strict review,” but regulation of truthful speech gives “far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands”), and
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (holding that commercial
speech is afforded “a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate
position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that
might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression”), with Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendment
protects the truthful advertising of “routine” legal services). Compare Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (holding that
the First Amendment protects speech that does “no more than propose a commercial
transaction” (citation omitted)), with Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1942)
(holding that the First Amendment was not violated when the defendant was prohibited
from distributing business advertising material in the public street).
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 1 (2008).
U.S. CONST. art. V.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 578 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1885); see
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV.
L. REV. 129, 138–39 (1893) (examining Alexander Hamilton’s descriptions of the federal
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world. Rather, as David Strauss among others has explained, constitutional law has developed much like the common law, with Court
decisions building on and often reversing prior decisions, and the
Court has generally not been deferential to other political decisionmakers in numerous areas of constitutional law. My thesis about
when Court decisions amount to de facto amendments to the Constitution accepts this strong system of judicial review as a fait accompli.
In this system, the Court does not improperly contravene Article V
when it changes its interpretations of vague constitutional words and
phrases such as “due process,” “equal protection,” “unreasonable
searches and seizures,” “speech,” “establishment,” and “free exercise.”
The shifts back and forth in these areas of law may simply reflect reasonable disagreements over ambiguous text and contested history
and amount to nothing more than the Court doing the best it can to
interpret our foundational document. Although the meaning and
application of the Constitution to hard cases changes regularly because the changing Justices cause shifts in judicial doctrine, the current system anticipates these changes without the need to formally
adhere to Article V.
When the Court ignores or distorts clear and unambiguous constitutional text, however, absent such an interpretation leading to an
absurd result, the Court is, in effect, amending the Constitution
without utilizing Article V procedures. For example, the Constitution
requires that the President be thirty-five years old, and if the Court
were to sanction a thirty-three-year-old President, then it would effectively and improperly amend the Constitution. Our system of judicial
review assumes that judges will take text at least partly seriously; otherwise the Constitution would have little binding force.
The next Part of this Article contends that the Court has improperly amended the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments without going
through the required Article V procedures. These sections do not
purport to exhaustively review the literature or arguments surrounding the Court’s interpretations of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, but rather simply demonstrate how my thesis about proper
constitutional change can be used to helpfully analyze Court decisions.

10

Constitution in the FEDERALIST NO. 78); see generally, e.g., ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS:
WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT AND ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES 176–83
(2012).
E.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877
(1996).
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I. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The Eleventh Amendment is one of the clearest provisions in the
United States Constitution. It provides that “[t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
11
State.” The Amendment quite obviously bars any suit, whether for
damages or an injunction, against a state by citizens of “another”
state.
In Hans v. Louisiana, decided in 1890, a citizen of Louisiana sued
12
Louisiana for unpaid interest on state bonds. His lawyer made the
obvious argument, based on clear text, that the Eleventh Amendment
could not bar the suit because a citizen of Louisiana was suing his
13
own state, not “another” state. The Court rejected this argument,
prohibited the suit, and in effect amended the Constitution without
Congress or the states using the procedures set forth in Article V.
The gist of the Court’s rationale was the following:
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was
understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in
the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of
foreign states, was indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when
proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that
nothing therein contained should prevent a State from being sued by its
own citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States: can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the States?
14
The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its face.

In fact, there is nothing absurd about states being amenable to
suits by their own citizens, but not citizens of other states. It is one
thing for the citizens of a state to raid their own treasury, but quite
another to allow citizens from other states to do so. Moreover, historians agree that the Eleventh Amendment was enacted specifically to
15
reverse the 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia, where the Court allowed
a citizen of South Carolina to sue Georgia, the precise situation
barred by the text of the Eleventh Amendment. There is nothing in
the text or history of the Eleventh Amendment to suggest it would
apply to citizens suing their own states.

11
12
13
14
15

U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
134 U.S. 1, 1 (1890).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 15.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 419 (1793).
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The modern Court has agreed that the text of the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar suits by citizens against their own states.
The conservative Justices have instead argued that “we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says,
16
but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.” Justice David H.
Souter has persuasively rebutted this argument by noting that “plain
text is the Man of Steel in a confrontation,” with background princi17
ples and presuppositions. Unfortunately, Justice Souter’s interpretation of the Amendment is just as counter-textual as the interpretation of the conservatives he is criticizing, as he would allow federal
question suits against a state brought by citizens of another state. To
the best of my knowledge, no Supreme Court Justice has ever advocated that the Eleventh Amendment be interpreted as it is written,
although it would make sense to do so. Such a reading might not be
the best or most desirable policy result, but it is the only one dictated
by clear text. This straying from unambiguous constitutional commands demonstrates how far the Court will go to ignore prior positive
law to achieve desired policy goals, even if it means effectively amending the Constitution to do so.
II. THE TENTH AMENDMENT
The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
18
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
19
Along with the Supremacy Clause in Article VI, the balance between
federal and state power could not be clearer: Congress only has
those powers enumerated in the Constitution (all other powers are
reserved to the states or the people), but when Congress validly exercises its powers, federal law trumps state law. The Tenth Amendment
and the Supremacy Clause do not tell us when Congress is properly
exercising its enumerated powers, but when Congress does so, state
law must give way.
20
In New York v. United States, the Court effectively amended the
Constitution by creating a non-textual exception to the constitutionally required federalism structure outlined above. The issue in New
16
17
18
19
20

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (citing Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
Id. at 116 n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Id. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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York was whether Congress could require the states to either clean up
low-level radioactive waste or assume responsibility for any damages
21
caused by the waste. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s majority opinion specifically conceded that the “[r]egulation of the . . . interstate
market in waste disposal is . . . well within Congress’ authority under
22
the Commerce Clause.” Justice O’Connor also said, “The States unquestionably do retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authority . . . to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of
their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Gov23
ernment.” Because the Court in New York conceded that Congress
has the power to regulate low-level radioactive waste, and because doing so does not violate any other provision of the Constitution, New
York’s challenge to Congress’s authority should have been rejected.
Instead of following the clear text and structure of the Constitution, however, the Court made up a new rule of constitutional law
(which it conceded did not derive from the text of the Tenth
24
Amendment), that Congress is not allowed to direct the states to
take certain actions, unless it does so through a generally applicable
law. This anti-commandeering principle (as it has come to be called)
cannot be found anywhere in the text of the Constitution. It is also
inconsistent with the idea that congressionally created federal law is
supreme, if it is authorized by an enumerated power and does not violate specific constitutional limitations on that power. As Justice
John Paul Stevens said in dissent,
21

22
23
24

Id. at 149, 152–53. In 1979, only three sites were open to properly dispose of low-level
radioactive waste; two were forced to shut down that year because they reached maximum
capacity. Id. at 150. The United States was faced with the possibility of not having any
disposal sites for low-level radioactive waste. Id. In 1985, Congress enacted the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act, which provided a compromise for states with and without
sites. Id. at 151. The Act would allow unsited states to use the facilities of sited states for
seven years, if the unsited states agreed to end their external reliance by 1992. Id. The
Act provided three incentives for a sited state to provide proper disposal of the waste
generated inside and outside their borders. Id. at 152. First, a state could impose a surcharge on waste collected from other states; the surcharges would be given to the government to redistribute to cooperating states. Id. Second, states could raise those surcharges to non-complying states and eventually deny them access altogether. Id. at 153.
Third, states that did not set up their own disposal sites before a mandatory deadline
would either have to take title to their waste or be liable for all damages caused by the
waste. Id. at 153–54. New York, “a State whose residents generate a relatively large share
of the Nation’s low level radioactive waste . . . complied with the Act’s requirements,”
then ceased to comply and sued the government, arguing the Act was inconsistent with
the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. Id. at 154.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 156 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985)).
New York, 505 U.S. at 156.
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The notion that Congress does not have the power to issue a simple
command to state governments to implement legislation enacted by
Congress, is incorrect and unsound. There is no such limitation in the
Constitution. The Tenth Amendment surely does not impose any limit
on Congress’ exercise of the powers delegated to it by Article I. Nor does
the structure of the constitutional order or the values of federalism mandate such a formal rule. To the contrary, the Federal Government directs state governments in many realms. The Government regulates
state-operated railroads, state school systems, state prisons, state elections, and a host of other state functions. Similarly, there can be no
doubt that, in time of war, Congress could either draft soldiers itself or
command the States to supply their quotas of troops. I see no reason why
Congress may not also command the States to enforce federal water and
air quality standards or federal standards for the disposition of low-level
25
radioactive wastes.

The unexpected rule the Court devised in New York, that Congress
is not allowed to require state legislatures to help implement federal
law, as Justice Stevens noted, is nowhere in the text of the Constitution and was not supported by any history cited in Justice O’Connor’s
opinion. The next time the Court returned to this issue was in Printz
26
v. United States. The issue was whether the federal government could
require state law enforcement officers to provide background checks
27
on gun purchasers prior to the creation of a national database.
This time, the parties fully briefed the issue of whether Congress
could commandeer state governments (here, state executive officers)
28
to help implement federal law. Once again, the five conservatives
held the answer was “no,” despite clear historical evidence to the con29
trary. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers, “[T]he
legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will
be incorporated into the operations of the national government as far
as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered auxilia30
ry to the enforcement of its laws.”
As Justice Stevens pointed out, “It is hard to imagine a more unequivocal statement that state judicial and executive branch officials
may be required to implement federal law where the National Gov25
26
27
28
29
30

Id. at 211 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot compel States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program by directly conscripting states’ officers).
Id. at 902.
See Brief for Petitioner at i, Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (No. 95-1478); Brief for United States at i,
Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (No. 95-1478).
Id. at 935.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 223 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1885) (second emphasis added).
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ernment acts within the scope of its affirmative powers.” In direct
contradiction to the clear text of the Tenth Amendment, and the
best historical evidence available, the Supreme Court has decided for
its own policy purposes that Congress is not allowed to commandeer
state legislatures and state executives (for a bizarre and never adequately explained reason, state courts fall outside this rule) when it
exercises its enumerated powers.
Conservative Justices have long argued that the structure of the
Constitution requires the rejection of a rule that would effectively al32
low the federal government to destroy state sovereignty. Requiring
states to help implement valid federal laws (passed pursuant to an
enumerated power), however, does no such thing. Moreover, the anti-commandeering principle allows the Court to overturn the exercise
of concededly valid congressional exercises of enumerated powers
based solely on the Justices’ idiosyncratic and shifting ideas of appropriate federalism values. That is not the scheme that the Constitution
sets forth in the Tenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause. If
the Justices are concerned that the exercise of an enumerated power
(such as the Commerce Clause) violates important state sovereignty
values, the Court should interpret the enumerated power differently
to give Congress less power, not concoct a non-textual limitation on
federal power found nowhere in the Constitution and inapposite to
the clear text. In other words, structural concerns certainly can help
inform interpretation, but they should not give birth to judicially
constructed rules that effectively amend the balance of power set
forth in the Constitution.
This criticism of New York and Printz does not rest solely on semantic concerns (because the same result could arguably be reached by
narrowing the interpretation of the Commerce Clause). Where text
is truly ambiguous, judges in a system of strong judicial review have
no choice but to turn to background and structural principles to apply that vague norm to difficult problems. But, where text is clear

31
32

Printz, 521 U.S. at 947–48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (holding that
the Commerce Clause did not grant Congress the authority to enact the Gun Free School
Zone Act, because it “forecloses the States from experimenting and exercising their own
judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of history and expertise, and it does
so by regulating an activity beyond the realm of commerce in the ordinary and usual
sense of that term”); Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (holding
that the Commerce Clause did not grant Congress the power to apply the Fair Labor
Standards Act to state governments because it would “impair the States’ ‘ability to function effectively in a federal system’”), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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and there is one meaning that is more persuasive than the rest, giving
Justices carte blanche to change that meaning to suit their policy
preferences gives them, in effect, the power to amend the document.
That is not the system of constitutional change embodied in the text
of the Constitution.
The decisions in New York and Printz may or may not be good policy, but they are inconsistent with the Constitution as written and,
therefore, amount to de facto amendments to that document without
using the procedures set forth in Article V. The rules the plaintiffs
wanted in these cases do not represent good faith disagreement with
ambiguous text and contested history, but rather, complete rejection
of what the Framers of the Constitution wrote and thought. The Supreme Court should not have embraced those rules because they
represent illegitimate constitutional change.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has gone back and forth over the years on
many issues involving vague constitutional text and contested history.
These flip-flops on questions like abortion, gun rights, affirmative action, speech, and religion may or may not represent the most persuasive interpretations of the Constitution (if such a thing exists), but
there is nothing inherently illegitimate about differing constructions
of ambiguous constitutional language and unclear historical understandings. Where, however, the text is perfectly clear, and undeniable history does not undermine that clarity, the Supreme Court effectively amends the Constitution when it ignores or distorts such text to
achieve its own policy objectives. That is exactly what has happened
with the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. The judicial interpretations of those provisions demonstrate that the Court has, from time
to time, amended the United States Constitution without implementing the procedures required by Article V.

